Constance Kassor’s review for Buddhadharma:
Few English-speaking scholars of Buddhism have been as influential as the late Jeffrey Hopkins. A prolific translator and teacher of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, Hopkins has inspired and paved the way for generations of students of Tibetan Buddhism, Madhyamaka philosophy, and Mahayana Buddhism more broadly. One of his most well-known works, the colossal Meditation on Emptiness, has now been edited and revised for the second time.
Meditation on Emptiness is a modern classic that presents the Prasangika-Madhyamaka view of emptiness according to the Geluk tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. In explaining this fundamental concept of Mahayana Buddhism, Hopkins draws heavily on a monastic textbook called the Great Exposition of Tenets, written by the 17th- and 18th-century scholar Jamyang Shaypa, a book that he would later go on to translate in its entirety.
Meditation on Emptiness was originally Hopkins’ doctoral dissertation and was published for the first time by Wisdom Publications in 1983. The second revised edition features forewords by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Donald Lopez and includes general edits for clarity, corrected typos, and the addition of gender-inclusive language. A preface has also been added, and translations for quoted works have been updated. A specific style of notation further aids the reader: notes offering additional explanation are italicized, and notes indicating references are presented in a more standard way.
In his foreword, Donald Lopez notes that while this revised edition honors the 40th anniversary of the first publication of Meditation on Emptiness, students of Hopkins were studying his dissertation long before. This is, in a sense, a piece of scholarship that is now half a century old. Hopkins writes that his book is “written with the intent of presenting not only what emptiness is but also how emptiness is realized in meditation, so that emptiness may become more than a concept of abstract philosophy.” The republication of this work ensures that future generations of practitioners and students will continue to learn about emptiness in deep and engaging ways.
[Please note that the text from which this excerpt derives makes use of footnotes and diacriticals; these are not represented in this excerpt.]
Excerpt:
Chapter 2
Self: The Opposite of Selflessness
Emptiness in all four Buddhist schools is a ‘self-emptiness’, but this does not mean that objects are empty of themselves. If objects were empty of themselves, then no object, not even an emptiness, would exist. rather, ‘self-emptiness’ in the Praasanngika system specifically refers to an object’s lack of its own inherent existence.
The term ‘self-emptiness’ distinguishes the Buddhist emptiness from systems such as samkhya, which assert that the person is empty of being the various other objects of the world. such an emptiness is an ‘other-emptiness’, and realization of it is attained through distinguishing one thing from another, as in the case of distinguishing the person (purussha) from the nature (prakrrti) that gives rise to all appearances according to the samkhya system. realization of a ‘self-emptiness’, on the other hand, involves distinguishing the absence of a false predicate of an object, for example, the absence of its own inherent existence, and does not involve distinguishing one entity from another entity. still, when emptiness is cognized directly, the objects that are the bases of the quality of emptiness do not appear to the mind. Based on this, some, including the Jo-nang-pas of Tibet, described the Buddhist emptiness as an ‘other-emptiness’.
That which is negated in the Praasanngikas’ subtle theory of selflessness is self, defined as inherent existence. The hypothetical equivalents of ‘self’ in the Praasanngika system are:
- true establishment (satya-siddhi/bhaava, bden par grub pa/dngos po)
- true existence (satya-sat, bden par yod pa)
- ultimate existence (paramaartha-siddhi, don dam par grub pa)
- existence as [its own] suchness (tattva-siddhi, de kho na nyid du grub pa)
- existence as [its own] reality (samyak-siddhi, yang dag par grub pa)
- establishment by way of its own character (svalaksshanna-siddhi, rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa)
- substantial existence (dravya-sat, rdzas yod)
- existence able to establish itself (tshugs thub tu grub pa)
- existence from the object’s side [rather than being imputed from the subject’s side] (svarūpa-siddhi, rang ngos nas grub pa)
- existence right within the object
- existence through its own power (svairi-siddhi, rang dbang du grub pa)
- existence in the object that receives designation (prajnnapti-vissha- ya-siddhi, btags yul gyi steng nas grub pa)
- existence right in the basis of designation (gdags gzhi’i steng nas grub pa)
- inherent existence (svabhaava-siddhi, rang bzhin gyis grub pa)
- existence through its own entityness (svabhaavataa-siddhi, ngo bo nyid gyis grub pa)
- existence in the manner of covering its basis of designation (gdags gzhi’i go sa gnon pa’i tshul du yod pa)
- existence from the side of the basis of designation (gdags gzhi’i ngos nas grub pa).
The members of this list are only ‘hypothetical’ equivalents because in Buddhist logic ‘equivalent’ (ekaartha) means ‘one object’, and thus all equivalents necessarily exist. since these terms for ‘self’ refer to non- existents, they can only be ‘hypothetical’ equivalents.
The subtle self that is negated in the Praasanngika view of selfless- ness implies an independent entity; thus, all these terms are opposites of dependent-arising. Each illuminates a little more the meaning of non-dependence. For instance, ‘existing from the side of the basis of designation’ means that if one searched to find the object designated, one would find it either among the bases of designation, or as their composite, or as the composite of their former and later moments. ‘substantially existent’ means not existing through the force of expressions but existing through the object’s own power. ‘Existing as able to establish itself’ means not established through the force of terms and expressions but existing in the object’s basis of designation by way of the object’s own entity. ‘Existing through its own power’ means existing through the object’s own particular mode of being.
The Praasanngikas’ unique meaning of ‘dependence’ is ‘establishment through the power of a designating consciousness’. Phenomena depend on thought in the sense that only if the thought that designates an object exists, can that object be posited as existing (conventionally), and if the thought that designates an object does not exist, the (conventional) existence of that object cannot be posited. since this applies to all objects, nothing exists inherently.
It is similar to the imputation of a snake to a rope. If a speckled and coiled rope is not seen clearly, the thought can arise, ‘This is a snake’. at that time, the composite of the parts of the rope and the parts themselves cannot at all be posited as a snake; the snake is only imputed by thought. In the same way, when in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates the thought ‘I’ arises, the composite of the former and later moments of the continuum of the aggregates, or the composite of the aggregates at one time, or the individual aggregates themselves cannot in the least be posited as the I. also, there is nothing that is a separate entity from the aggregates or their composite which can be apprehended as I. Therefore, the I is only established by thought in dependence on the aggregates and does not exist inherently, as it appears to do.
The same type of analysis can be applied to a person and his/her relationship to the six constituents that are his/her bases of imputation or designation—earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness. a person is not a collection of these, nor any of them individually, nor anything separate from them. a person is thereby shown not to exist inherently.
Praasanngika is the only school that accepts all the above mentioned terms as equivalent; the non-Praasanngika schools do not attach the same significance to these terms and thus organize them differently. For instance, the Chittamaatrins certainly would not say that dependent phenomena (paratantra) are independent just because they inherently exist; for them ‘inherent existence’ merely means that objects have their own mode of being. The Praasanngikas, however, answer that the very words, ‘inherent existence’ or ‘own mode of being’, imply independence.
Also, the non-Praasanngikas say that if phenomena were only designated in the sense of being unfindable among their bases of designation, they would not exist at all because the unfindable could not possibly be functional. However, for the Praasanngikas the other schools have missed the meaning of ‘only designated’ or ‘only imputed’ (prajnnapti-maatra, btags pa tsam); Praasanngikas say that although this term means that the object designated is not its basis of designation, it does not imply non-functionality. It is a central but difficult point of the Praasanngika-Maadhyamika system that what is merely designated can be functional, just as a girl created by a magician can attract an unwitting audience.
It is said that often when yogis think they are progressing in understanding the presentation of emptiness, they lose ground in understanding the presentation of conventional objects and that often when they think they are progressing in understanding the presentation of conventional objects, they lose ground in understanding the presentation of emptiness. It must be borne in mind that for one who has found the Praasanngika view, progress in the presentation of emptiness aids in the presentation of conventional objects and progress in the presentation of conventional objects aids in the presentation of emptiness.
Through refuting only inherent existence and not refuting mere existence, the Praasanngikas avoid the extreme of annihilation. Through affirming only nominal existence and not affirming inherent existence they avoid the extreme of permanence. In other words, they describe precisely how things do and do not exist. The lack of even nominal or designated existence would be an extreme of annihilation—an extreme of non-existence—because objects do exist imputedly. Inherent existence would be an extreme of permanence—an extreme of existence—because objects do not inherently exist.
The extremes are no nominal existence, which would mean no existence whatsoever, and inherent existence—the first being ‘finer’ and the second being ‘coarser’ than the correct presentation. The main extreme conceptions, therefore, are the conception that things do not designatedly exist and the conception that things exist inherently. The extremes do not exist, but their conceptions do and can be destroyed.
Many think that the Praasanngikas have fallen to an extreme of nihilism, being no different from the nihilists who deny the existence of rebirth, and so forth. The Praasanngikas themselves refute any similarity; they say that one cannot ascertain the emptiness of former and later births through just the non-perception of former and later births. One must first identify what former and later births are and identify their existence. Then, through reasonings such as the present birth’s becoming a past birth when the future birth becomes the present birth, one identifies that past, present, and future births are mutually dependent and thus do not exist inherently. Identifying that former and later births do not exist inherently, one ascertains the emptiness of births. such identification both of the positive subject (births) and the negative predicate (absence of inherent existence) is essential, for one cannot ascertain an emptiness just by seeing nothing.
The nihilists referred to here are the Dialectician nihilists and not the Meditating nihilists, for some of the latter attain meditative clairvoyance and thereby realize a limited number of former and future births. The Dialectician nihilists assert that future lives do not exist because no one is seen to come here to this life from a former life and no one is seen to go from this life to a future life. The Maadhyamikas, on the other hand, assert that future lives do not exist inherently because they are dependent-arisings or, in other words, because they are designated by terms and thoughts. However, they do not deny the existence of former and future lives. Both the theses and the reasons of the nihilists and the Maadhyamikas are very different.
3 Meditation: Identifying self
Jam-yang-zhay-pa delineates five stages in meditation on emptiness. These outline the progress of one newly developing the powers of meditation:
- how a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness
- how to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of calm abiding
- how to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm abiding
- how to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness
- how to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest Yoga Tantra.
First stage of Meditation on Emptiness
How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of emptiness
During the first stage yogis gain an initial familiarity with the meaning of emptiness through one of several reasonings. They proceed through three basic essentials in meditation: identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness, ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason, and establishing the reason’s presence in the subject.
The initial object of meditation is the selflessness of the person; the reasoning used is the sevenfold reasoning as set forth by Chandrakirti.
1 Identifying the object negated in the theory of selflessness
First, one concentrates and clears one’s mind. sitting quietly, one waits for the I to appear. If it does not, an appearance of it is created by thinking ‘I’, and with a subtle type of consciousness one watches the appearance.
If the consciousness that watches the appearance is too strong, one will not see the I, or it will appear and quickly disappear. Therefore, one should allow the consciousness conceiving I to be generated continuously, and through watching this I as if from a corner, one will gain a firm sense of it.
One could also imagine that one is being accused, even falsely, and watch the sense of I. One could remember an incident of false accusation, during which one thought, ‘I did not do this, I am being wrongly accused.’ By watching the I who is accused, a firm sense of the way that the non-analytical intellect apprehends I can be ascertained.
If the memory of such an accusation is not strong, a yogi cultivates it until the sense of I as misconceived by the innate non-analytical intellect is obvious. This innate mind does not analyze whether the I is the same as or different from mind and body. Without any reasoning and through the force of habituation, it conceives of an I that is as if self-sufficient, able to establish itself, naturally or inherently existent from the very start and fused with the appearance of mind and body.
Though such an I does not in reality exist, an image or concept of it does exist and will appear. It is initially difficult to identify the appearance of a concrete I, but in time it becomes obvious. sometimes the I appears to be the breath, and sometimes the stomach as when one has an upset stomach and says, ‘I am sick.’ sometimes the I appears to be the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness. In sum, the I appears at times to be physical and at times mental. The Fifth Dalai Lama says that in the end the appearance of the I and the appearance of the mind and body are as if mixed like water and milk, undifferentiable, but so clear as to seem graspable with the hand.
Tsong-kha-pa’s disciple Kay-drup says in his Manual of Instructions on the View:
If the mind thinking ‘I’ is not generated, you should fabricate the thought ‘I’ and immediately thereafter analyze its mode of appearance. You will thereby come to know its mode of appearance without mixing it with any other object . . . If you look gently from a corner without losing the conscious- ness thinking ‘I’, there is a separate mode of appearance of I to the consciousness which thinks ‘I’, and this appearance is not any of the mental and physical aggregates. The I does not appear to be just a nominal designation, but appears as if self-established. Through holding that the I exists the way it appears, you are bound in cyclic existence.
Can the I appear to be self-established if its appearance is undifferentiatedly mixed with that of mind and body? It would seem logically impossible for it to be self-established and yet mixed, but the innate intellect apprehending I does not analyze its object logically before, during, or after its apprehension. The appearance of a self-established I is mixed with the appearance of factors of mind and body but is not exactly the same. The present Dalai Lama’s senior Tutor, Ling Rinpoche, also known as Ling Lung-tok-nam-gyal-trin-lay (1903–83), said that if someone sticks a pin in your finger, you feel that the pin has been stuck in you and not just in your finger. You have a distinct sense of the I that is hurt.
In order to ascertain this appearance, it is extremely important to prolong subtle examination of it without letting it immediately disappear. Some teachers advise watching the I for a week or even months before proceeding to the second step.
It is interesting to note that the jiva or ‘limited individual being’ in Vedaanta is often said to be the size of the thumb and located in the ‘heart’. In Vedaanta the jiva is to be merged with the infinite self, Brahman, and in Buddhism the appearance of a concrete I is analyzed, found to be non-existent, and overcome, resulting eventually in a direct realization of emptiness in which the subject, the wisdom consciousness, is merged with its object, emptiness, like fresh water poured into fresh water.
© 2025 by Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness: Second Revised Edition.
Reprinted by arrangement with Wisdom Publications.
